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This paper investigates the association of earnings quality with corporate performance using a
sample of publicly listed firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2004 to
2010. We find that low earnings quality is associated with high corporate performance. There
is a suspicion that earnings management may distort earnings quality and manipulate earnings
upwards, and thus lead to the negative relationship between earnings quality and corporate
performance. However, our further evidence, obtained by examining unmanaged earnings,
earnings-increase management and financially distressed firms, shows that earnings
management is only a contributor to the negative relationship, not its main driver. We argue
that the negative association of earnings quality with corporate performance is a phenomenon
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The Association of Earnings Quality with Corporate Performance: Evidence from the
Emerging Market of China

Abstract
Purpose – Poor earnings quality is characterized by unhealthy profitability and/or untrue
financial information, which leads to a misallocation of capital and low corporate
performance. The largest emerging economy of China has experienced a fast and fluctuant
growth, while the companies have been thought of low earnings quality. This paper
investigates the association of earnings quality with corporate performance of publicly listed
firms of China and tries to provide a new explanation.
Design/methodology/approach – Initial univariate and multivariate analyses are conducted
using four earnings quality measures and either accounting based corporate performance or
market based corporate performance. Further analyse apply unmanaged earnings, earningsincrease management and financially distressed firms.
Findings – We find that low earnings quality is associated with high corporate performance
for the Chinese publically listed firm in our sample period. Further evidence shows that
earnings management is only a contributor to the negative relationship, not its main driver.
We argue that the negative association of earnings quality with corporate performance is a
phenomenon of a new emerging market within an economy booming period, particularly in
China.
Originality/value – In theoretical discussion, this paper partitions earnings quality into two
components: One results from reporting accuracy and the other results from firm’s operating
outcome. In empirical analyses, this paper examines both accounting based performance and
market based performance, and both managed earnings and unmanaged earnings.
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Research limitations/implications – The results and argument of this paper may not totally
follow the traditional literature. But they provide a new research question that requires further
studies.
Keywords: Earnings quality; earnings management; corporate performance; emerging
market; China
Paper type: Research paper
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1. Introduction
Earnings quality has drawn a great deal of attention from academics and entrepreneurs
because it incorporates much more information on corporate operations and financial
reporting, and may consequently impact corporate performance. Two types of definition of
earnings quality are frequently referenced. One type of definition concerns the degree to
which the quantity of earnings reflects a firm’s economic reality (Dechow and Schrand, 2004;
Chan et al., 2006; Hodge 2003). In other words, earnings quality denotes that the financial
statement reports accurately and impartially the firm’s corporate operating status and
financial position. In this definition, a close match between earnings and cash flow is viewed
as high quality, because earnings may be manipulated by inflating accruals. The other type of
definition recognizes earnings quality as the degree to which earnings persist or are sustained
into the next period (Richardson et al., 2005, 2006; Revsine et al. 1999). In this definition,
high variation and volatility of earnings is viewed as low quality, because earnings
uncertainty is a risk for corporate operation and adds to the cost of capital.
The relevant literature claims that having high-quality earnings is a desirable trait in
companies. Poor earnings quality is characterized by unhealthy profitability and/or untrue
financial information, and is thus detrimental to investors and other users of financial
statements. Low-quality earnings can lead to a misallocation of capital, and may generate
inappropriate outcomes for contracts that use accounting data as inputs (Schipper and Vincent
2003). Low-quality earnings also introduce an information risk to investors, and thereby
increase the cost of capital (Francis et al. 2004). The positive relationship between earnings
quality and corporate performance is theoretically proved.
However, empirical result seems not always to provide evidence that high earnings
quality is associated with high corporate performance and vice versa. Chan et al. (2006)
examine the market valuation of earnings quality. They find that increased earnings
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accompanied by high accruals suggest low earnings quality. Penman and Zhang (2002)
document that growth firms in sales or net operating assets are accompanied with lower
earnings quality. In this research on Chinese publically listed firms, we find that earnings
quality in majority measures has negative relations with corporate performance. We argue
that this negative association can be explained by the following theoretical insight.
Regardless of the various definitions of earnings quality, several measures have been
popularly employed in examining it: accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings
predictability, earnings smoothness, value relevance, timeliness, and conservatism (Francis et
al., 2004; Dechow et al., 2010). The earnings quality measures can be estimated by either use
of firm-year specific time series regression or use of industry-based cross-sectional regression.
Both methods are constructed on the principle of generating benchmark earnings for the
calculation of earnings variations or estimated errors.
The deviation from reported earnings to the benchmark earnings consists of two
components, represented by the formula: reported earnings – benchmark earnings = (reported
earnings – real earnings) + (real earnings – benchmark earnings). One component is the
difference between reported earnings and real earnings, which results from reporting
accuracy. The other is the difference between real earnings and the benchmark, which results
from a firm’s operating outcome. Dechow et al. (2010) state that earnings quality is jointly
determined by the relevance of underlying fundamental performance and by the ability of the
accounting system to measure performance. Thus, we contend that any test of earnings
quality using the aforementioned measures is a joint test of the firm’s fundamental
performance and financial reporting accuracy.
The benchmark earnings generated by the models are treated as desirable, because
when the deviation from the reported earnings to the benchmark earnings is small, the
earnings quality is deemed to be high; otherwise the earnings quality is deemed to be low. If

5

we ignore the question of the rationale for benchmark earnings being desirable
unconditionally, the earnings quality is only relevant to reported earnings. However, the
reported earnings are a joint function of corporate operation and financial reporting, which
determine earnings quality (Dechow et al., 2010).
On the corporate operating side, either significant revenue increases or decreases or
fluctuates will lead to actual earnings deviation from benchmark earnings. Those sorts of
earnings are uncertain, less predictable, low persistence and showing low quality. On the
financial reporting side, significant increased accruals (represented as discretionary accruals)
can either result from the growth of sales and preparation for the growth of sales or from
earnings management that uses accruals to inflate and smooth earnings.
In the new emerging market of China, the mainstream of firms has remarkable
expansion in production and sales. This can be observed from the growth of the national
economy at a rate of 10% on average in the past ten years. Yet, earnings quality has been
recognized as low due to uneven expansion of production and possible earnings management.
We argue that low earnings quality could be a by-product of the fast growth of the economy
in an emerging market. The upward trend of the economy dominates the negative effect of
earnings volatility and reporting inaccuracy. Thus low earnings quality can be accompanied
by high corporate performance.
Keeping this argument in mind, we investigate the relations between earnings quality
and corporate performance for firms publicly listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock
markets from 2004 to 2010. Firstly, by using accounting-based measures of corporate
performance, our empirical results indeed show that low earnings quality is associated with
high corporate performance. Next, we eliminate the possible earnings management
component from the corporate performance. The unmanaged corporate performance is still
negatively associated with earnings quality, although the significance is slightly lower.
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Furthermore, we classify companies as having earnings-increase management and earningsdecrease management. The negative association of earnings quality with corporate
performance is found in both classes of companies. Finally, we employ market-based
measures of corporate performance in the robustness tests. The negative association of
earnings quality with corporate performance is still estimated on several earnings quality
measures, although there is one exception. We also compare the earnings quality and firm
performance of financially distressed firms with those of normal firms. The earnings quality
and firm performance of financially distressed firms are significantly lower than those of
normal firms.
To the best of our knowledge, we are extending the literature by conducting a
systematic study of the relation between earnings quality and corporate performance for
Chinese listed firms. The contribution of this research is that we are the first to claim, and
provide evidence, that earnings quality is negatively associated with corporate performance in
the new emerging market of China. If judged according to the mainstream opinion of the
existing literature, that earnings quality is positively associated with corporate performance,
our findings may seem unusual. We argue, with our further evidence, that the association of
low earnings quality with high corporate performance is probably an inherent phenomenon of
emerging markets. The fast and fluctuating growth is a main driver of the coexistence of low
earnings quality and high corporate performance in emerging markets such as China.
Emerging markets are a large component of the world market. Identifying the phenomena
that characterize an emerging market, or the emerging period of a market, would rich
emerging market literature.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature
and describes institutional background. Section 3 develops the measures of earnings quality
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and corporate performance. Section 4 presents and analyses the empirical results generated
from various modellings. Section 5 concludes the paper.

2. Literature and research hypotheses
No consensus exists in the literature about the concept of earnings quality. Dechow and
Schrand (2004) state that a high-quality earnings number accurately reflects a company’s
current operating performance and is a good indicator of future operating performance.
Financial statements will be less useful when the reported accounting earnings do not reflect
the firm’s financial activity throughout the reporting period (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).
Dechow and Schrand (2004) also indicate that high-quality earnings should be easily
convertible into cash. This represents a high correlation between earnings and cash flow and
low accruals volatility.
Ball and Brown (1967, 1968) contend that high earnings quality should be valued on
the equity market. Thus, they use market responses to earnings news to refer to earnings
quality. Schipper and Vincent (2003) view earnings quality in relation to Hicksian income,
that is the maximum amount that can be consumed consistent with the maintenance of wealth.
According to Kirschenheiter and Melumad (2004), high-quality earnings are more
informative to the long-run value of the firm. Revsine et al. (1999) consider that earnings are
of higher quality when they are sustainable. Richardson et al. (2005) treat earnings quality as
the degree to which earnings performance persists into the future.
Francis et al. (2005) state that earnings quality is influenced by two types of factors:
those that reflect innate features of business models and operating environments, and those
that reflect the financial reporting process. Dechow et al. (2010) set a framework for thinking
about earnings quality: Reported earnings = f (X), where X is a firm’s fundamental
performance and f represents the accounting system that converts the unobservable X into
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observable earnings. Thus, earnings quality is impacted by both the firm’s fundamental
performance and the ability of the accounting system to measure performance.
In practice, earnings quality measures can be estimated using the firm-year specific
method (Francis et al., 2004; Dechow and Schrand, 2002). This method performs a time
series regression and treats firm post earnings (or cash flow and accruals etc.) as benchmarks.
Alternatively, earnings quality measures are estimated using cross-sectional regression
methods (McNichols and Stubben, 2008; Cornett et al. 2008). This method is based on
industrial identification and treats the average of earnings (scaled by an indicator such as total
assets) in the industry as a benchmark. The estimated coefficients (such as earnings
persistence), forecasting errors (such as discretionary accruals) or adjusted R-squares (such as
value relevance) generated in the regressions could represent earnings quality. Therefore, the
deviation of current earnings from benchmark earnings, which is reflected in the parameters,
is the key determinant of the level of earnings quality.
Because earnings quality is impacted by both the firm’s fundamental performance and
the accuracy of accounting in reporting this performance, it is possible that low earnings
quality is accompanied with high corporate performance. Dechow and Schrand (2004)
indicate that companies in growing industries will typically have high accruals and large
estimation errors. High accruals and large estimation errors imply deviation of earnings from
cash flow and underlying volatility in the company’s operation, and thus low quality earnings.
In particular, companies with extensive growth options are likely to have low-quality
earnings that are practically irrelevant for evaluating current performance and predicting
future performance. Thus, we set up our research hypotheses:
H1: In an emerging market experiencing an economic boom, it is possible that high
corporate performance is associated with low earnings quality due to fluctuating growth.
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H2: Earnings management may distort earnings quality and manipulate corporate
performance upwards. However, in an emerging market, earnings management is not
necessarily the main driver of high corporate performance and low earnings quality.
H3: The association of low earnings quality with high corporate performance is
probably an inherent phenomenon of an emerging market. Fast and fluctuating growth
results in the coexistence of low earnings quality and high corporate performance in the
emerging market of China.

3. The measures of earnings quality and corporate performance
The measures of earnings quality
Earnings quality can be measured from various dimensions. Schipper and Vincent (2003)
propose several earnings quality measures, including earnings persistence, predictability, and
variability, which are derived from time series properties of earnings. Francis et al. (2004)
classify seven earnings quality measures as accounting-based or market-based, depending on
the underlying assumptions and the data type used in the computation.
Based on current literature and data availability, this study employs the following four
earnings quality measures: accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, and
discretionary accrual. Kothari et al. (2005) indicate that earnings management most likely
takes place at the end of the financial year, suggesting that the manipulation of accounting
numbers occurs simultaneously across firms. Firms therefore are exposed to a clustering
effect in total accruals. Thus, the cross-sectional method may dramatically reduce the
efficiency of panel estimates. The firm-year specific method treats the firm as its own
benchmark and mitigates concerns that differences between firms in a given industry give
rise to noisy measures in the constructs (Francis et al. 2004). Therefore, in this research all
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the earnings quality measures are estimated by the firm-year specific method and by a rolling
five-year window.
Accruals quality
The gap between earnings and cash is accruals. Earnings that map more closely into cash
flows are more desirable. One role of accruals is to shift or adjust the recognition of cash
flows over time, so that the adjusted number can better reflect firm performance. The
measure of accruals quality we use is based on Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) model relating
total current accruals to the lagged, current, and future cash flows from operations,
represented as equation (1):
TCAj ,t
Assets j ,t −1

CFO j ,t −1
CFO j ,t
CFO j ,t +1
b0 + b1
=
+ b2
+ b3
+ e j ,t
Assets j ,t −1
Assets j ,t −1
Assets j ,t −1

where TCA

j, t

represents the firm j’s total current accruals in year t; Assets

(1)

j, t − 1

is firm j’s

total assets in year t − 1; CFO j, t is firm j’s cash flow from operations in year t.
The accruals quality is represented by the standard deviation of estimated residual σ



( ε j ,t ). Large (small) values of σ ( ε j ,t ) correspond to lower (higher) accruals quality and
lower (higher) earnings quality, because there is less (more) precision about the mapping of
current accrual into current-period, last-period and next-period cash flows.
Earnings persistence
Earnings persistence captures earnings sustainability, and thus persistent earnings are viewed
as desirable because they are recurring (Francis et al. 2004). To measure persistence,
researchers generally conduct a regression of the future value of the variable on its current
value (Dechow and Schrand 2004). Kormendi and Lipe (1987) apply firm-level regressions
on current earnings to estimate the earnings persistence. The present study employs the
measure in Kormendi and Lipe (1987) and uses the following equation:
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Earn j ,t
Assets j ,t −1

Earn j ,t −1
=
δ 0 + δ1
+ v j ,t
Assets j ,t −1

(2)

where: Earn j, t represents firm j’s net income before extraordinary items in year t; and Earn j, t
−1

is firm j’s net income before extraordinary items in year t − 1.
The measure that captures earnings persistence is based on the slope-coefficient

estimate δ1 . Values of δ1 close to 1 (or greater than 1) indicate highly persistent earnings,
while values close to zero imply highly transitory earnings. Persistent earnings are viewed as
higher quality, while transitory earnings are viewed as lower earnings quality.
Earnings predictability
Earnings predictability refers to the ability of earnings to be predicted in a time interval
(Boonlert-U-Thai et al. 2006). Dichev and Tang (2009) investigate the relationship between
earnings volatility and earnings predictability, and find a negative relationship between
earnings volatility and earnings predictability. Francis et al. (2004) measure earnings
predictability using the square root of the estimated error-variance from the earningspersistence equation. In line with Francis et al. (2004), this study measures earnings
predictability using the square root of the error variance from the equation of earnings
persistence (2):
Pred j ,t = σ 2 (νˆ j ,t )

(3)

where: σ 2 (νˆ j ,t ) represents the estimated-error variance of firm j in year t, calculated from
equation (2).
Large values of σ 2 (νˆ j ,t ) imply less predictable earnings. More predictable earnings are
viewed as desirable and of higher earnings quality, while less predictable earnings are viewed
as being of lower quality.
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Discretionary accrual
Total accruals can be divided into nondiscretionary accruals (or normal accruals) and
discretionary accruals (or abnormal accruals). Discretionary accruals are the component that
cannot be explained by accounting fundamentals. The use of discretionary accruals as a
measure of earnings quality is based on the view that discretionary accruals are not well
explained by accounting fundamentals (fixed assets and revenues), and are inversely related
to earnings quality (Francis et al. 2006).
In practice, the discretionary accruals are usually first estimated using Jones’ (1991)
model to obtain the coefficients k1, k2, and k3; and then using a modified Jones model
(Dechow et al. 1995) to calculate nondiscretionary accruals. Finally, the difference between
total accruals and nondiscretionary accruals is discretionary accruals, as represented in the
equations (4), (5), and (6).
TA j ,t
Assets j ,t −1

= k1

PPE j ,t
∆Rev j ,t
1
+ k2
+ k3
+ ω j ,t
Assets j ,t −1
Assets j ,t −1
Assets j ,t −1

(4)

DRev j ,t − DAR j ,t ˆ PPE j ,t
1
NDAj ,t =
kˆ1
+ kˆ2
+ k3
Assets j ,t −1
Assets j ,t −1
Assets j ,t −1

=
DAj ,t

TA j ,t
Assets j ,t −1

(5)

− NDAj ,t

(6)

where: TA j, t represents the total accruals of firm j in year t, which is equal to total current
accruals plus depreciation; Rev

j, t

property, plant and equipment; AR

is the revenue of firm j in year t; PPE
j, t

j, t

is the gross

is the accounting receivable of firm j in year t; NDA j, t

represents nondiscretionary accruals; and DA j, t represents discretionary accruals.
Both positive and negative discretionary accruals that are significantly different from
zero represent low earnings quality. To keep the description consistent, we use the absolute
value (abs) of discretionary accruals as an earnings quality measure. Large (small)
discretionary accruals (abs) equate to low (high) earnings quality.
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The measures of corporate performance
We firstly employ four accounting-based measures of corporate performance. EBIT/assets
(earnings before interest and tax scaled by assets) is a typical measure of profitability relative
to total capital. It is commonly used to examine corporate performance (Cornett et al. 2008).
EBIT/sales is an alternative measure of profitability scaled by value of sales, and represents
profitability in terms of a firm’s activity of sales. Because EBIT consists of CFO and
nondiscretionary accruals (NDA) and discretionary accruals (DA), managers can influence
EBIT through their assumptions concerning accruals; that is, their manipulation of
discretionary accruals. In order to obtain a performance measure that is relatively free from
manipulation, we adopt an unmanaged performance measure that was put forward by Cornett
et al. (2008): (EBIT − discretionary accruals)/assets or equivalently EBIT/assets − %DA.
Alternatively, we design another unmanaged performance measure that is (CFO +
nondiscretionary

accruals)/assets

or

equivalently,

CFO/assets

+

%NDA1.

We further employ a market-based measure of corporate performance in a robustness
test: Tobin-Q, which is a ratio of market value of equity plus net book value of liability to
book value of equity plus net book value of liability. Because, there are tradable and nontradable shares for a majority of firms, we adopt two types of Tobin-Q. In Tobin-Q1, the
market value of equity is the market price multiplied by total number of shares. In Tobin-Q2,
the market value of equity is the market price multiplied by total number of shares plus book
value of non-tradable shares.
Sample and summary statistics
Our initial sample comprises the firms that issued A shares and were listed on either the
Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges for at least six consecutive years from 1999 to 20102.
We eliminate firms that have an incomplete data set and thus did not qualify for our analysis.
We eliminate financial firms, because they are subject to special regulations and are
14

characterized by a unique capital structure. We also exclude firms classified by the China
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) as being “particular treatment” (PT) firms. PT
firms are identified as having suffered a loss for three consecutive years and have heavy
restrictions imposed on their reporting and share trading. Most PT firms are suspended from
business, and further delisted or merged. However, we have included “special treatment” (ST)
firms. ST firms are identified as having experienced negative profit for two consecutive years,
but are still allowed to continue operating like normal firms. Most ST firms recover from
financial distress, but others may go on to become PT firms.
Since the calculation of earnings quality measures requires yearly increments or the
prior year’s data or both the prior and subsequent years’ data, and the measures are generated
by regression modellings in a rolling five-year window, the number of examinable
observations shrinks. The final sample consists of 1,176 firms with 7,921 firm-year
observations reported from 2004 to 2010, which constitutes an unbalanced panel data set.
The majority of data are collected from the China Stock Market and Accounting
Research Database (CSMAR) created by the GTA Information Technology Company and the
University of Hong Kong. The supplementary data come from a series of Shanghai Stock
Exchange Statistical Annuals, Shenzhen Stock Exchange Fact Books and firms’ annual
reports available on their homepages. Some errors have been corrected by checking various
data sources.
In order to avoid extreme outliners, we follow the practice put forward by Francis et al.
(2004) to winsorize

the values of earnings quality measures, corporate performance

measures, and control variables that are represented by ratios to the 99 percent and 1 percent
values. Panel A of Table I presents descriptive statistics of earnings quality. As Cornett (2008)
indicates, discretionary accruals must be reversed at some point. Due to the summation of
positive and negative discretionary accruals generated from auto-regression, the average
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value should be near zero. The average discretionary accruals in our sample are small, at 0.51
percent of assets. The average absolute value of discretionary accruals is relatively large, at
6.76 percent of assets.
Table I. Summary statistics of earnings quality measures, corporate performance and control variables
Variable Definition
Panel A: Earnings quality measures
Accruals quality
Earnings persistence
Earnings predictability
Discretionary accrual
Absolute value of discretionary accrual
Panel B: Corporate performance measures
EBIT/assets
EBIT/sales
EBIT/assets − %DA
CFO/assets + %NDA
Tobin-Q1
Tobin-Q2
Panel C: Control variables
Total assets (million)
Leverage (liability/assets)
Growth of sales
Top5 ownership (%)
Dummy for state being the largest
shareholder
Dummy for A-share firms issuing B-shares
Dummy for ST firms

Mean

Median

Standard
25th
75th
deviation percentile percentile

0.0418
0.3677
0.0571
0.0051
0.0676

0.0266
0.2157
0.0248
−0.0001
0.0360

0.0522
1.1334
0.1350
0.1376
0.0983

0.0117
−0.1429
0.0113
−0.0361
0.0141

0.0532
0.7396
0.0572
0.0358
0.0801

0.0264
0.0254
0.0239
0.0178
1.8355
2.3902

0.0329
0.0542
0.0349
0.0210
1.3307
1.7159

0.1421
0.5707
0.1998
0.1856
1.4500
2.1464

0.0100
0.0161
−0.0225
−0.0424
1.0440
1.2157

0.0665
0.1252
0.0926
0.0806
2.0012
2.6558

5700
0.5723
0.1903
50.57
0.5098

2095
0.5463
0.1278
50.94
1.0000

24582
0.3032
0.5044
15.23
0.4999

1007
0.4024
−0.0367
39.62
0

4474
0.6759
0.3133
61.20
1.0000

0.0981
0.1348

0
0

0.2975
0.3415

0
0

0
0

Notes: The description of earnings quality measures and corporate performance measures is in section 3. The
description of control variables is in section 4. Our initial sample comprises firms that issued A shares and were
listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges for at least six consecutive years from 1999 to 2010.
Since the calculation of earnings quality measures requires yearly increments or the prior year’s data or both
prior and subsequent years’ data, and the measures are generated by regression modellings in a rolling five-year
window, the number of examinable observations shrinks. The final sample consists of 1,176 firms with 7,921
firm-year observations reported from 2004 to 2010, which constitutes an unbalanced panel data set.

All earnings quality measures have larger means than medians, with each having almost
doubled in value. This implies that the values of earnings quality measures are right skewed.
The standard deviations of all earnings quality measures are larger than their means. For
instance, the standard deviation of accruals quality is 0.0522, while its mean is 0.0418; the
standard deviation of earnings persistence is 1.1334, while its mean is 0.3677. This large
standard deviation indicates the high dispersion of earnings quality of Chinese listed firms.
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Panel B of Table I presents corporate performance measures. The EBIT/assets and
EBIT/sales are based on reported earnings, and are also called managed earnings. The assetsscaled EBIT is more concentrated than the sales-scaled EBIT, because the former in
comparison with latter has a larger mean, lower standard deviation, and smaller spread
between the 25th percentile and 75th percentile. The corporate performance measures
EBIT/assets − %DA and CFO/assets + %NDA are based on unmanaged earnings, since
discretionary accruals are not included in the earnings. Because discretionary accruals can be
either positive or negative, the unmanaged earnings are not necessarily smaller than managed
earnings. The two Tobin-Qs have larger mean than standard deviation, suggesting that
market-based measures of performance are less dispersed than accounting-based measures.
Hitherto, the large raw values of earnings persistence represent high earnings quality,
and the large raw values of other earnings quality measures represent low earnings quality.
Francis et al. (2004) put a negative sign on the measures that large values represent high
earnings quality. Therefore all measures become that large values represent low earnings
quality. For ease of understanding and discussion, we hereafter give negative signs to the raw
values of accruals quality, earnings predictability, and absolute value of discretionary
accruals. Therefore, all earnings quality measures in our study become the large the high
earnings quality.
Table II arranges the correlation coefficients. The top triangle matrix represents the
correlation between corporate performance measures. We can see that the correlation
coefficients between any pair of accounting-based measures and between the two marketbased measures are all positive and significant at better than 1 percent levels. Only the
market-based measures have a negative correlation with unmanaged earnings, but they are
insignificant. On the bottom right-hand side, a triangle matrix represents the correlation
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coefficients between any pair of earnings quality measures. All the correlation coefficients
are positive and at 1 percent significance or better.
Table II. Correlation coefficients between corporate performance and earnings quality measures
EBIT/asset

(1)

EBIT/sales

(2)

EBIT/assets − %DA

(3)

CFO/assets+ %NDA

(4)

Tobin-Q1

(5)

Tobin-Q2

(6)

Accruals quality

(7)

Earnings persistence
Earnings predictability
Discretionary accrual (abs)

(1)

(2)

0.747
(.001)
0.863
(.001)
0.362
(.001)
0.047
(.001)
0.022
(.053)

0.624
(.001)
0.244
(.001)
0.048
(.001)
0.029
(.010)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.379
(.001)
0.011 -0.015
(.318) (.171)
-0.009 -0.023
(.443) (.142)

0.919
(.001)

0.046 -0.002
0.053
(.889) (.001) (.250)
(8) -0.084 -0.098 -0.057
(.001) (.001) (.001)
(9) -0.024 -0.028 -0.012
(.033) (.013) (.275)
(10) 0.014 0.012
0.002
(.229) (.286) (.0.875)

-0.014
(.002)
-0.019
(.084)
-0.093
(.001)
-0.049
(.001)

-0.202
(.001)
-0.043
(.000)
-0.249
(.001)
-0.086
(.001)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

-0.244
(.001)
-0.034
(.003)
-0.335
(.001)
-0.117
(.001)

0.043
(.001)
0.398
(.001)
0.336
(.001)

0.047
(.001)
0.006
(.001)

0.195
(.001)

Notes: Values in parentheses are probabilities of significances. The description of earnings quality measures and
corporate performance measures is in section 3. The description of control variables is in section 4. The top
triangle matrix represents the correlation between corporate performance measures. The bottom right-hand
triangle matrix represents the correlation coefficients between any pair of earnings quality measures. The
rectangle matrix between the two triangles represents the correlation coefficients between earnings quality
measures and corporate performance measures. The sample consists of 1,176 firms with 7,921 firm-year
observations.

The rectangle matrix between the two triangles represents the correlation coefficients
between earnings quality measures and corporate performance measures. Earnings
persistence and earnings predictability have negative correlations with all corporate
performance measures and most of them are at the 5 percent or better significance level. The
other earnings quality measures have more negative correlation coefficients than positive
correlation coefficients with corporate performance measures, while the positive coefficients
are insignificant. Overall, the negative correlation coefficients dominate the rectangle matrix.
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High earnings quality is related to low corporate performance, and can be viewed in most of
the cells.

4. Empirical analyses
Model design
Earnings quality has an association with corporate performance. In addition to earnings
quality, many factors impact on corporate performance and are associated with earnings
quality. We chose several important factors as control variables to establish an environment
commonly determined by those factors, so that we could insulate the effects of those
variables from that of earnings quality.
Firm size is often selected as a control variable in research. On the one hand, firm size
is related to operational efficiency and the ability to protect firms from risk. On the other
hand, firm size is correlated with the amount of cash flow and accruals, which are inherently
linked to earnings quality. We use total assets to represent firm size and the logarithm of total
assets as an independent variable in our modelling.
Leverage is another popularly chosen control variable. Leverage represents the tradeoff between tax benefit and bankruptcy cost. In particular, the level of leverage reflects the
firm’s potential risk, and accordingly influences the firm’s reporting and accrual accounting
policies. The leverage here is the ratio of total liability to total assets.
The agency issue is always detected as a factor influencing corporate performance,
financial reporting, and earnings quality, while ownership concentration is considered a
determining factor of the agency issue. For example, one argument states that high ownership
concentration can reduce agency costs by aligning the interests of owners and managers
(Heugens et al., 2009; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986 and 1997). We employ the ownership ratio
of the five top shareholders as the proxy of ownership concentration.
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Sustainable corporate development is essential for good corporate performance. Firms
with contracted business find it difficult to achieve expected profitability. Managers also
make discretionary accounting treatments in terms of their firms’ prospects. When they
forecast poorer business in the coming year, they may conduct earnings-decrease
management in the current year and earnings-increase management in coming year, so that
the earnings are smoothed to show a less volatile trend. We use the growth ratio of sales to
represent the firm’s growth potential.
We employ a dummy variable for firms that issued B shares, while their main equity
sources are financed from the domestic A share market. Having foreign investors may mean
that the corporate performance and earnings quality is different from those of fully
domestically owned firms. We apply a dummy variable for ST firms. Both earnings quality
and the corporate performance of ST firms are recognized as being low. We also apply a
dummy variable for the state as the largest investor in a firm. State-controlled firms have
been criticized for their low efficiency and for having more access to resources and markets.
We use a dummy variable to control for industry difference. CFO and accruals vary
significantly from one industry to another. Industry type is an important concern in earnings
management research. We also use a dummy variable to control for time differences and for
possible macroeconomic policy changes.
The statistics of the controlling variables are summarized in panel C of Table I. The
average size of listed firms in the sample studied is 5,700 million Chinese yuan (equivalent to
US$863.64 million at the 31st December 2010), which is larger than the values of the median,
25th, and 75th percentiles, and thus shows that most firms are small in size. The leverage is
57.23 percent on average, indicating that more than half of capital is liability. The annual
growth of sales is 19.03 percent, although at least 25 percent firms have a negative growth
ratio. The state is the largest shareholder in 50.98 percent of listed firms. Approximately 9.81
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percent of the listed A share firms also issued B shares. The ST firms comprise
approximately 13.48 percent of total listed companies, which implies that financially
distressed firms are a considerable proportion of total companies.
Our fundamental regression model to detect the association of earnings quality with
corporate performance is as follows:
P=
α i ,t + βi ,t Qi ,t + F 'i ,t λ2,t + I 'i ,t λ3,t + +Y 'i ,t λ4,t + ε i ,t
i ,t

(7)

where: i indicates a firm and t represents a year; P is a corporate performance measure that
can be either an accounting-based on EBIT or a market-based on Tobin-Q ; Q is an earnings
quality measure; F is a vector of a firm’s characteristic variables that include firm size,
leverage, ownership status, and so on; I is a vector of industry dummy variables in terms of
industry classification promulgated by the Chinese Security Regulatory Committee in 1999;
Y is a vector of yearly dummy variables; and α, β 1 , λ 2 , λ 3 , and λ 4 are coefficients or vectors of
relevant coefficients. The cluster effect in standard deviation of errors is corrected at the firm
level.
Initial empirical results
Table III summarizes the regression results of the accounting-based measure of corporate
performance (EBIT/assets) on earnings quality. Each model specifies an investigation on one
type of earnings quality measure associated with corporate performance. We observe that the
coefficients of earnings quality measures are negative in all models and at the 5% or 1%
significance level. Earnings quality has a negative association with corporate performance.
The positive coefficients of firm size and negative coefficients of leverage ratio are
statistically significant at 1 percent, which mirrors many other studies of corporate
performance (for example, Ma et al. 2010; Givoly et al. 2010; Firth et al. 2008). Large firms
are most likely to have more opportunity for business expansion. High leverage introduces
bankruptcy costs and reduces profitability. Ownership by the Top 5 shareholders has a
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positive impact on corporate performance and is significant at the 10 percent level, or high
for three out of four estimated coefficients. Ownership concentration mitigates agency costs
and increases profitability. The growth of sales is highly positively related to corporate
performance at better than 1 percent significance. High growth in production and sales are the
drives of increasing profitability. ST firms are certainly characterized by low performance
due to negative profit. The coefficients of the state as largest shareholder are all negative and
three out of four are at 10 percent significance or higher. State ownership, accompanied by
lower efficiency, has been observed in many investigations. The foreign ownership of B
shares has no influence on corporate performance.
Table III. Regression analyses on corporate performance of EBIT/assets associated with earnings quality
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Intercept
-0.0686
-0.0774
-0.1716
-0.0811
(-1.36)
(-1.47)
(-3.57)***
(-1.55)
Accruals quality
-0.1846
(-1.96)**
Earnings persistence
-0.0108
(-4.44)***
Earnings predictability
-0.2340
(-5.91)***
Discretionary accrual (abs)
-0.1200
(-2.10)**
Logarithm of assets
0.0066
0.0083
0.0130
0.008
(2.78)***
(3.51)***
(5.73)***
(3.40)***
Leverage ratio
-0.1461
-0.1368
-0.1641
-0.1395
(-9.45)***
(-9.06)***
(-11.47)***
(-9.23)***
Top5 ownership
0.0003
0.0003
0.0001
0.0002
(1.8)*
(2.05)**
(0.36)
(1.98)**
Growth of sales
0.0491
0.0486
0.0417
0.0494
(8.81)***
(10.36)***
(9.65)***
(10.48)***
ST firm dummy
-0.0547
-0.0404
-0.0477
-0.0433
(-7.82)***
(-6.15)***
(-7.35)***
(-6.85)***
State dummy
-0.0023
-0.0073
-0.0051
-0.0074
(-0.66)
(-2.52)**
(-1.76)*
(-2.65)***
B shares dummy
0.0006
0.0012
-0.0007
0.0033
(0.11)
(0.22)
(-0.13)
(0.64)
Industry dummy
Include
Include
Include
Include
Yearly dummy
Include
Include
Include
Include
Adjusted R-square (%)
21.49
20.19
23.03
19.95
Notes: The description of earnings quality measures and corporate performance measures is in section 3. The
description of control variables is in section 4. The sample consists of 1,176 firms with 7,921 firm-year
observations. Values in parentheses are t-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%
respectively.
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We replace the corporate performance measure EBIT/assets with EBIT/sales in our
models and report on them in Table IV. The regressions of earnings scaled by sales are
almost the same as the regressions of earnings scaled by assets: All coefficients of earnings
quality are negative and at the 1% to 10% significance levels. The only difference worthy of
notice is that the coefficients of the control variables state dummy and ownership
concentration become insignificant. Overall the regression results in Tables III and IV
provide empirical evidence that validates our hypothesis one: In an emerging market
experiencing an economic boom it is possible that high corporate performance is associated
with low earnings quality.
Table IV. Regression analyses on corporate performance of EBIT/sales associated with earnings quality
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Intercept
-0.4979
-0.4992
-0.7184
-0.4405
(-2.45)**
(-2.37)**
(-3.84)***
(-2.08)**
Accruals quality
-0.9394
(-2.49)**
Earnings persistence
-0.0504
(-6.06)***
Earnings predictability
-0.6505
(-5.19)***
Discretionary accrual (abs)
-0.2834
(-1.68)*
Logarithm of assets
0.0312
0.0379
0.0489
0.0339
(3.18)***
(4.00)***
(5.72)***
(3.60)***
Leverage ratio
-0.5026
-0.4589
-0.5366
-0.4687
(-8.65)***
(-7.85)***
(-9.38)***
(-8.04)***
Top5 ownership
0.0004
0.0003
-0.0003
0.0002
(0.73)
(0.70)
(-0.64)
(0.48)
Growth of sales
0.172
0.1652
0.1468
0.1674
(7.35)***
(8.39)***
(7.55)***
(8.45)***
ST firm dummy
-0.1489
-0.0872
-0.1043
-0.0898
(-4.2)***
(-2.48)**
(-2.93)***
(-2.61)***
State dummy
0.0096
-0.0082
-0.0034
-0.0091
(0.58)
(-0.59)
(-0.24)
(-0.65)
B shares dummy
0.0073
-0.0023
-0.003
0.0067
(0.31)
(-0.09)
(-0.12)
(0.28)
Industry dummy
Include
Include
Include
Include
Yearly dummy
Include
Include
Include
Include
Adjusted R-square (%)
15.08
13.81
14.40
12.88
Notes: The description of earnings quality measures and corporate performance measures is in section 3. The
description of control variables is in section 4. The sample consists of 1,176 firms with 7,921 firm-year
observations. Values in parentheses are t-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%
respectively.
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Empirical results with unmanaged earnings
Low earnings quality associated with high corporate performance may be the
consequence of managers’ manipulation of earnings. Cornett et al. (2008) define EBIT/assets
as a managed corporate performance measure, because it includes discretionary accruals that
may be used by management to boost earnings. They employ an unmanaged corporate
performance measure that subtracts discretionary accruals from earnings: EBIT/assets
− %DA. In addition to borrowing sprite from Cornett et al., we introduce another unmanaged
corporate performance measure: CFO/assets + %NDA. We substitute the managed
performance measures with unmanaged performance measures in the models to see whether a
change occurred in the association between earnings quality and corporate performance when
the possible manipulation is removed.
Table V shows the results of regression of EBIT/assets − %DA on earnings quality.
Table V and Table III are directly comparable, because the only difference is the
discretionary accruals removed from earnings in the dependent variable in Table V. Except
that the coefficient of accruals quality becomes insignificant, all coefficients of other earnings
quality measures, such as earnings persistence, earnings predictability and discretionary
accruals (absolute value), are still negative and statistically significant at 1 to 10 percent
convention levels. However, the coefficients become smaller in comparison with those in
Table III, and the t-values also decrease in absolute value correspondingly. The negative
association between earnings quality and corporate performance turns out to be weak when
discretionary accruals are removed from managed earnings.
The results of regression of CFO/assets + %NDA on earnings quality are arranged in
Table VI. By contrast to those in Table V, the coefficient of earnings persistence becomes
insignificant, while the coefficient of accruals quality becomes significant. However, the
signs, t-values and magnitudes of coefficients of other earnings quality measures and control
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variables are similar, i.e., the estimates in the two tables have no conclusive difference. Thus,
we have twofold evidence shown in Tables III and IV for the relationship between earnings
quality and managed corporate performance, and shown in Tables V and VI for the
relationship between earnings quality and unmanaged corporate performance. Therefore, the
empirical evidence supports our hypothesis two: Earnings management may distort earnings
quality and manipulate corporate performance upwards to some extent. However, earnings
management is not the main driver of high corporate performance and low earnings quality.
Table V. Regression analyses on unmanaged corporate performance of EBIT/assets − %DA associated with
earnings quality
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Intercept
-0.0372
-0.0402
-0.1418
-0.0505
(-0.74)
(-0.81)
(-2.89)***
(-1.02)
Accruals quality
-0.1430
(-1.43)
Earnings persistence
-0.0078
(-3.47)***
Earnings predictability
-0.2176
(-5.82)***
Discretionary accrual (abs)
-0.1057
(-1.97)**
Logarithm of assets
0.0061
0.0069
0.012
0.0069
(2.59)***
(3.12)***
(5.16)***
(3.10)***
Leverage ratio
-0.1397
-0.1337
-0.1602
-0.1366
(-9.04)***
(-9.17)***
(-11.17)***
(-9.31)***
Top5 ownership
0.0002
0.0003
0.0001
0.0003
(1.43)
(2.07)**
(0.62)
(2.00)**
Growth of sales
0.0382
0.0383
0.0319
0.0389
(6.73)***
(8.18)***
(7.20)***
(8.30)***
ST firm dummy
-0.0484
-0.0384
-0.0444
-0.0413
(-6.73)***
(-5.69)***
(-6.62)***
(-6.28)***
State dummy
-0.0016
-0.0039
-0.0018
-0.0037
(-0.43)
(-1.22)
(-0.55)
(-1.19)
B shares dummy
-0.0005
0.001
-0.0024
0.0017
(-0.08)
(-0.01)
(-0.38)
(0.30)
Industry dummy
Include
Include
Include
Include
Yearly dummy
Include
Include
Include
Include
Adjusted R-square (%)
15.61
15.05
17.56
15.61
Notes: The description of earnings quality measures and corporate performance measures is in section 3. The
description of control variables is in section 4. The sample consists of 1,176 firms with 7,921 firm-year
observations. Values in parentheses are t-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%
respectively.
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Table VI. Regression analyses on unmanaged corporate
earnings quality
Model 1
Intercept
0.0038
(0.07)
Accruals quality
-0.2501
(-2.62)***
Earnings persistence

performance of CFO/Assets + %NDA associated with
Model 2
0.0431
(0.84)

Model 3
-0.1051
(-2.2)**

-0.0023
(-0.77)

Earnings predictability

-0.2874
(-6.62)***

Discretionary accrual (abs)
Logarithm of assets
Leverage ratio
Top5 ownership
Growth of sales
ST firm dummy
State dummy
B shares dummy

Model 4
0.016
(0.31)

0.0042
(1.53)
-0.1183
(-9.89)***
0.0006
(3.84)***
0.0538
(5.52)***
-0.0418
(-5.38)***
-0.0108
(-2.38)**
-0.0138
(-2.12)**

0.003
(1.23)
-0.1168
(-9.5)***
0.0007
(4.71)***
0.0585
(6.11)***
-0.027
(-3.24)***
-0.0147
(-3.47)***
-0.0114
(-1.88)*

0.0104
(4.57)***
-0.1513
(-12.81)***
0.0005
(3.19)***
0.0494
(5.56)***
-0.0345
(-4.32)***
-0.0114
(-2.83)***
-0.0158
(-2.62)***

-0.1816
(-2.29)**
0.0036
(1.5)
-0.1211
(-9.91)***
0.0007
(4.58)***
0.0587
(6.11)***
-0.0303
(-3.8)***
-0.0134
(-3.16)***
-0.0104
(-1.74)*

Include

Include

Include

Include

Include
12.84

Include
11.60

Include
15.47

Include
12.31

Industry dummy
Yearly dummy
Adjusted R-square (%)

Notes: The description of earnings quality measures and corporate performance measures is in section 3. The
description of control variables is in section 4. The sample consists of 1,176 firms with 7,921 firm-year
observations. Values in parentheses are t-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%
respectively.

Empirical results with earnings- increase and earnings-decrease management
We have detected negative relationships between earnings quality and corporate performance
in the full sample. It has been suspected that earnings management distorts earnings quality
and manipulates earnings upward, and thereby creates a negative association between
earnings quality and corporate performance. However, earnings management may be
earnings-increase management, in which discretionary accruals should be larger than zero
(%DA>0), and earnings-decrease management, in which discretionary accruals should be
smaller than zero (%DA≤0). If the negative association results from earnings management,
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earnings-increase management and earnings-decrease management should have different
effects on corporate performance.
Next we tested whether the two opposite types of earnings management result in similar
negative associations between earnings quality and corporate performance. To do so, we split
the full sample into 3,979 firm-year observations with %DA>0, and 3,942 firm-year
observations with %DA≤0. We ran all the models, except for model 4, for each group of
firms. We did not run model 4, because its explanation variable is an absolute value of
discretionary accruals. When the sample is structured in terms of positive or negative
discretionary accruals, the regression coefficient of absolute value of discretionary accruals
may be biased.
To save space, we here only report the estimated coefficients of earnings quality
measures in Table VII. In the columns of %DA>0 and %DA≤0 under the dependent variables
EBIT/assets and EBIT/sales, all the coefficients are negative and most of them are significant
at the 1 to 10 percent levels. Although the absolute values of several earnings quality
coefficients or levels of significance in the earnings-increase management columns are larger
than those in earnings-decrease management columns, the others are just the opposite, so it is
hard to generalize which type of earnings management leads to a more significant negative
association between earnings quality and corporate performance.
Similarly, in the columns of %DA>0 and %DA≤0, under the dependent variables of
unmanaged earnings EBIT/assets − %DA and CFO/assets + %NDA, all coefficients are
negative and most of them are significant at the 1 to 10 percent levels. While we have
removed the earnings management component, low earnings quality is still associated with
high corporate performance regardless of the possible earnings-increase or earnings-decrease
management.

27

Overall, the results in the columns of EBIT/assets, EBIT/sales, EBIT/assets − %DA and
CFO/assets + %NDA in Table VI roughly match those in Tables III, IV, V, and VI
respectively. The negative coefficients dominate the earnings quality measures in those
tables—most of them significantly at convention levels. The negative association of earnings
quality with corporate performance exists in both earnings-increase managed firms and
earnings-decrease managed firms, which coincides with our hypothesis three:

The

association of low earnings quality with high corporate performance is probably an inherent
phenomenon of an emerging market. Fast and fluctuating growth leads to the coexistence of
low earnings quality and high corporate performance in the emerging market of China.
It seems that earnings-increase management manipulates earnings up and earningsdecrease management manipulates earnings down. Because both types of earnings
management distort earnings quality, at the same level of earnings quality, firms with
earnings-increase management should have relatively higher corporate performance than
firms with earnings-decrease management. However, with firms conducting earningsincrease management this is just because their real earnings are lower than the expected level,
whereas, with firms undertaking earnings-decrease management it is most likely that their
real earnings are higher than the expected level (Healy 1985). Thus the association of
earnings quality and corporate performance is less determined by the direction of earnings
management.

Further evidence with ST firms
We review the regression results presented in Tables III, IV, V, and VI and observe that the
coefficients of the ST firm dummy variable in all models are negative at the 1 percent
significance level. Therefore, it is true that ST firms display a low corporate performance.
However, the negative associations between earnings quality and corporate performance have
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been observed thoroughly in our empirical evidence. Does this mean that ST firms have
higher earnings quality than normal firms? To answer this question, we test the differences
between normal firms and ST firms in earnings quality and corporate performance. The
summary of results is presented in Table VIII.
It can be seen that all the earnings quality measures of ST firms are lower than normal
firms. Furthermore, the corporate performance measures of ST firms are much lower than
those of normal firms. For example, the accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings
predictability, and discretionary accruals of ST firms are lower than those of normal firms by
71.46 percent, 9.03 percent, 195.57 percent, and 45.510 percent respectively. In contrast,
corporate performance measures of ST firms’ EBIT/assets, EBIT/sales, EBIT/assets − %DA
and CFO/assets + %NDA are lower than those of normal firms by 257.78 percent, 459.91
percent, 249.12 percent, and 265.56 percent respectively.
The performance of ST firms is much lower than normal firms, while the earnings
quality of ST firms is lower or marginally higher than normal firms. Thus, the earnings
quality of ST firms is relatively “better” than normal firms using their respective performance
as a benchmark. We also repeat the regressions in models 1 to 6 for the samples with only ST
firms, and only normal firms, respectively. We obtain all the negative coefficients of earnings
quality measures, and most are statistically significant at the 5 percent or 10 percent levels.
The results are not reported here, but are available on request. This evidence also supports
our two hypotheses. Although earnings management and financial distress draw earnings
quality down, they are not the principal factors that determine the negative association
between earnings quality and corporate performance.
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Table VII. Regression analyses on corporate performance associated with the earnings quality for firms with positive and negative discretionary accruals respectively
Dependent variable
EBIT/assets
EBIT/sales
CFO/assets + %NDA
EBIT/assets − %DA
%DA>0
%DA≤0
%DA>0
%DA≤0
%DA>0
%DA≤0
%DA>0
%DA≤0
Accruals quality
−0.2053
−0.1389
−1.0199
−0.7377
−0.1398
−0.4769
−0.4174
−0.0245
(−2.18)**
(−0.92)
(−2.45)***
(−1.39)
(−1.48)
(−3.49)***
(−2.80)***
(−0.24)
Earnings persistence
−0.0032
−0.0144
−0.0318
−0.0569
−0.0018
−0.0132
−0.0022
−0.0057
(−1.20)
(−4.20)***
(−4.09)***
(−4.77)***
(−0.68)
(−4.04)***
(−0.42)
(−1.90)*
Earnings predictability
−0.2347
−0.2088
−0.6234
−0.6627
−0.19164
−0.2478
−0.4541
−0.0970
(−4.59)***
(−3.35)***
(−3.83)***
(−3.13)***
(−4.34)***
(−3.84)***
(−6.59)***
(−1.67)*
Notes: The description of earnings quality measures and corporate performance measures is in section 3. The description of control variables is in section 4. The
sample consists of 1,176 firms with 7,921 firm-year observations of which 3,979 have positive discretion accruals and 3,942 have negative discretion accruals. The
coefficients of intercepts and control variables are not reported. Values in parentheses are t-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%
respectively.

Table VIII. The differences of corporate performance and earnings quality between normal firms and ST firms
Panel A: Earnings quality measures
Accruals quality
Earnings persistence
Earnings predictability
Discretionary accrual (abs)
Panel B: Corporate performance measures
EBIT/assets
EBIT/sales
EBIT/assets − %DA
CFO/assets + %NDA

ST firms

Normal firms

−0.0655
0.3386
−0.1336
−0.0711

−0.0382
0.3722
−0.0452
−0.0492

−0.0639
−0.2397
−0.0595
−0.0500

0.0405
0.0666
0.0399
0.0302

Difference

%Difference

t-statistics

Wilcoxon test

−0.0273
−0.0336
−0.0884
−0.0219

−71.46%
−9.03%
−195.57%
−45.51%

−2.94***
−0.90
−20.44***
−9.90***

−11.92***
−7.94***
−29.77***
−7.24***

−0.1044
−0.3063
−0.0994
−0.0802

−257.78%
−459.91%
−249.12%
−265.56%

−8.52***
−9.26***
−5.53***
−2.95***

−25.41***
−20.76***
−18.62***
−17.69***

Notes: The description of earnings quality measures and corporate performance measures is in section 3. The description of control variables is in section 4. The sample
consists of 1,176 firms with 7,921 firm-year observations of which 1,068 are on ST firms and 6,853 are on normal firms. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and
1% respectively.
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Robustness tests
In the robustness tests, we replace the accounting-based measures of corporate performance
with the market-based measure of corporate performance Tobin-Q. Table IX represents the
results of regression on Tobin-Q1, which is the ratio of market value of total shares
outstanding plus net book value of liability divided by book value of equity plus net book
value of liability. If we compare Table IX with Tables III to IV, the regression results on
accounting-based measures of corporate performance, we find that only the coefficient of
earnings persistence becomes positive, though insignificant. All other coefficients of earnings
quality remain negative and are significant at convention levels. The results assert that low
earnings quality is associated with high corporate performance according to both accountingbased and market-based measures.
However, we argue that earnings quality and accounting-based measures of corporate
performance are directly determined. When a company experiences fluctuating growth, high
corporate performance and low earnings quality should be reflected in accounting data
simultaneously. The earnings quality and market-based measures of corporate performance
are indirectly related. The investors’ attitude to the accounting data is a key which shows that
how the market responds to the earnings quality. For example, because of the coexistence of
companies’ fluctuating growth and low earnings quality, if investors are more concerned
about firms’ earnings growth than their earnings quality, the positive relation between firms’
earnings growth and market-based measures of corporate performance, and the negative
relation between earnings quality and market-based measures of corporate performance,
should coexist.
Interestingly, the coefficients and significance levels of several control variables in
Table IX are different from the relevant ones in Tables III to VI. For example, the firm size
(Logarithm of assets) has a negative coefficient in Table IX, while it has positive coefficients
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in Tables III to VI. The negative coefficient of firm size in Table IX is probably evidence of
the small firm effect put forward by Fama and MacBeth (1973). The coefficient of ST firm is
positive in Table IX, but negative in Tables III to VI. The reason is that when a firm is
becoming distressed before falling into the ST category, the market evaluates this firm
negatively. When a firm has been classified ST, the possibility of, or released news regarding,
merger, restructure and government assistance always pushes the market price up. The
difference in the coefficients of other relevant control variables between regressions of
accounting-based measures and market-based measures may be explained by market
efficiency and behavioural finance theories, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
Table IX. Regression analyses on corporate performance of Tobin-Q1 associated with earnings quality
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Intercept
16.304
18.6144
17.2809
18.029
(17.13)***
(19.19)***
(17.55)***
(20.24)***
Accruals quality
-3.3340
(-3.76)***
Earnings persistence
0.0303
(1.49)
Earnings predictability
-2.4344
(-4.16)***
Discretionary accrual (abs)
-1.6934
(-3.05)***
Logarithm of assets
-0.7644
-0.8001
-0.7336
-0.7783
(-16.07)***
(-17.3)***
(-15.5)***
(-18.16)***
Leverage ratio
0.7159
0.7666
0.4824
0.7495
(3.24)***
(3.36)***
(2.05)**
(3.43)***
Top5 ownership
0.0120
0.0069
0.0047
0.0065
(5.07)***
(3.04)***
(2.22)***
(2.87)***
Growth of sales
0.0796
0.1201
0.0391
0.1141
(4.45)***
(4.03)***
(3.95)***
(4.05)**
ST firm dummy
0.2118
0.3528
0.2891
0.3126
(1.82)*
(2.84)***
(2.51)**
(2.55)**
State dummy
-0.0228
-0.2475
-0.2159
-0.2384
(-4.41)***
(-4.70)***
(-4.14)***
(-4.56)***
B shares dummy
0.5813
0.5738
0.5285
0.5716
(1.68)*
(2.45)**
(0.77)
(2.34)**
Industry dummy
Include
Include
Include
Include
Yearly dummy
Include
Include
Include
Include
Adjusted R-square (%)
44.55
38.82
40.56
38.65
Notes: The description of earnings quality measures and corporate performance measures is in section 3. The
description of control variables is in section 4. The sample consists of 1,176 firms with 7,921 firm-year
observations. Values in parentheses are t-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%
respectively.
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Table X represents the results of regression on Tobin-Q2. The equity value is the
market value of total shares in the numerator of Tobin-Q1, whereas the equity value is the
market value of tradable shares plus book value of nontradable shares in the numerator of
Tobin-Q2. Tobin-Q1 may overstate market performance and the Tobin-Q2 may understate
market performance, considering that equity market value is higher than equity book value
overall. Nevertheless, the coefficients of earnings quality measures in Table X are similar to
those in Table IX, regardless of the difference in some control variables.
Table X. Regression analyses on corporate performance of Tobin-Q2 associated with earnings quality

Intercept
Accruals quality

Model 1
9.9493
(15.46)***

Model 2
12.0605
(17.73)***

Model 3

Model 4

11.4961

11.7092

(17.19)***

(18.79)***

-1.8516
(-2.84)***

Earnings persistence

0.0110
(0.83)

Earnings predictability

-1.0364
(-2.87)***

Discretionary accrual (abs)
Logarithm of assets
Leverage ratio
Top5 ownership
Growth of sales
ST firm dummy
State dummy
B shares dummy

-0.4200
(-13.04)***
0.1460
(1.02)
-0.0036
(-2.19)**
0.0258
(3.60)***
0.0951
(1.46)
-0.0740
(-2.13)**
0.2903
(0.85)

-0.4606
(-14.45)***
0.1494
(0.97)
-0.0075
(-4.71)***
0.0570
(3.48)***
0.1482
(1.99)**
-0.3049
(-8.73)***
0.2899
(1.66)*

-0.4325
(-13.61)***
0.0283
(0.19)
-0.0084
(-5.3)***
0.0226
(3.37)***
0.1210
(1.67)*
-0.2915
(-8.37)***
0.2709
(0.62)

-0.8175
(-2.17)**
-0.4468
(-15.23)***
0.1437
(0.96)
-0.0077
(-4.87)***
0.0536
(3.49)***
0.1277
(1.74)*
-0.3031
(-8.78)***
0.2880
(1.56)

Include

Include

Include

Include

Include
42.73

Include
35.13

Include
35.83

Include
34.84

Industry dummy
Yearly dummy
Adjusted R-square (%)

Notes: The description of earnings quality measures and corporate performance measures is in section 3. The
description of control variables is in section 4. The sample consists of 1,176 firms with 7,921 firm-year
observations. Values in parentheses are t-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%
respectively.
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In the robustness tests, we also follow the approach of Francis et al. (2004) in ranking
the value of each quality each year to form deciles. Because high raw values of accruals
quality, earnings predictability, earnings smoothness, and discretionary accruals correspond
to low earnings quality, we rank the deciles for these four measures in descending order.
Meanwhile, because high raw values in earnings persistence correspond to high earnings
quality, we rank the deciles for earnings persistence in ascending order. Thus, a firm in the
top decile (decile 10) has the highest earnings quality, and a firm in the bottom decile (decile
1) has the lowest earnings quality.
We replaced the values of each earnings quality measure with relevant deciles and then
repeated the regression analyses. The results by decile-approach are somewhat dissimilar to
those by value-approach in Tables III to VIII. First, the significance of many coefficients of
earnings quality measure declines, but most are still at the convention level of 10 percent or 5
percent. Second, the signs of a few coefficients change. For example, with the regression of
EBIT/assets, the coefficient t-values of accruals quality and earnings persistence decrease in
absolute value from −1.96 to −1.78, and from −4.44 to −2.11 respectively. With the
regression of EBIT/sales, the coefficient t-value of absolute discretionary accruals becomes
1.12 from a previous −1.88. However, negative and statistically significant at convention
levels are the main characteristics of the coefficients of earnings quality measures in the
regressions that use deciles. The prior detected negative association between earnings quality
and corporate performance still holds in the robustness tests ─ it does not qualitatively
change. To save space, we do not report the robustness test results here, but they are available
on request.
Finally, we borrow the spirit of Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Francis et al. (2005),
which decomposes accruals quality into innate accruals quality (InnateAQ) and discretionary
accruals quality (DisAQ). The innateAQ is derived from firms’ operational characteristics
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represented by firms’ innate factors: firm size, standard deviation of cash flow, standard
deviation of sales revenues, length of operating cycle and the appearances of negative
earnings. We conduct regression of accruals quality on firms’ innate factors and obtain the
fitted value of innateAQ3. We, therefore, repeat the regression of the model by replacing
earnings quality measures with the innateAQ. We find that the innateAQ is positive in the
regression on managed earnings (EBIT/assets and EBIT/sales) and negative in the regression
on unmanaged earnings (CFO/assets + %NDA and EBIT/assets - %DA). In particular, the
coefficients of EBIT/sales and EBIT/assets - %DA are statistically at 1% significance. The
results imply that firms’ operating characteristics may be negative to earnings quality in the
Chinese context in which firms have high growth in sales and earnings, which is likely to be
consistent with our main argument.

5. Conclusion
Earnings quality is an important concern for managers and investors because it conveys
information about firms’ operational and financial status. The mainstream of theoretical
analyses asserts that earnings quality has a positive association with corporate performance.
Low earnings quality implies either high risk, which increases the cost of capital, or
information bias, which leads to incorrect managerial decisions. However, empirical evidence
does not always support the theoretical conclusion (Chan et al., 2006; Penman and Zhang,
2002). In particular, we find a negative association with corporate performance for publicly
listed companies in the Chinese market.
To obtain reliable evidence, we employ four attributes of earnings as earnings quality
measures: accruals quality, earnings persistence, predictability and discretionary accruals. We
use four corporate performance measures: earnings before interest and tax scaled by total
assets, earnings before interest and tax scaled by sales, earnings before interest and tax less
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discretionary accruals then scaled by total assets, and cash flow plus nondiscretionary
accruals then scaled by total assets. The last two corporate performance measures are
assumed to exclude the earnings management effect.
Our regression results show that, when the corporate performance measures include
discretionary accruals, the earnings management component, all the coefficients of the
earnings quality measures are negative and significant at the convention level. When the
effect of the earnings management component is removed from the corporate performance
measures, three out of four coefficients of the earnings quality measures are negative and
significant at convention levels. Our further analyses on the subsamples of earnings-increase
management firms and earnings-decrease management firms, as well as financially distressed
(ST) firms, provide almost consistent results. The robustness tests using the market-based
performance measure of Tobin-Q, and using the decile ranking of earnings quality, do not
generate significantly different results.
The negative association of earnings quality with corporate performance seems a puzzle
in terms of the most frequently cited literature. We argue that earnings quality is a joint
function of financial reporting accuracy and fundamental corporate performance (Dechow et
al., 2010). In particular, the earnings quality measures represented by the coefficients and
forecast errors are determined by the deviation of reporting earnings from the benchmark
earnings, i.e.: reported earnings – benchmark earnings = (reported earnings – real earnings) +
(real earnings – benchmark earnings). The former component results from earnings
management and the latter from corporate operations.
In an emerging market experiencing an economic boom, many firms experience high
volatility and rapid growth of earnings. Although earnings management is likely used to
inflate earnings upwards for some firms, earnings management is not the primary cause of the
negative association between earnings quality and corporate performance. Instead, the highly
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volatile and rapid growth of firms’ earnings is the main driver of the negative association of
earnings quality with corporate performance. Low earnings quality and high corporate
performance are an inherent phenomenon in a period of fast economic development in the
emerging market of China.

Notes:
1

Theoretically, because EBIT = CFO + nondiscretionary accruals + discretionary accruals, then EBIT/assets

− %DA = CFO/assets + %NDA. Actually, due to the time variance of accounting data entries and accounting
issues recognition, EBIT/assets − %DA is not equal to CFO/assets + %NDA. However, they are closely
correlated. We employed both for more robust evidence.
2

China’s stock market comprises A and B shares. A shares are accessible by Chinese investors. B shares were

accessible by foreign investors before 2001, and by all investors thereafter.
3

The standard deviation of cash flow, standard deviation of sales and appearances of negative earnings are

calculated by a rolling five-year window due to the short history of the Chinese stock market.
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